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Farmland values in the United States represent a major component of the farm sector 
balance sheet.  The linkage between farmland values and agricultural debt has typically 
been ignored in the literature.   This paper attempts to make two contributions to our 
understanding of farmland prices.  First, building on established literature, this study 
examines the role of debt solvency and government payments in farmland valuation.  
Second, from a methodological standpoint, this study incorporates both the 
nonstationarity dimension of farmland prices and the panel structure of the data relying 
on recent advances in econometric literature. 
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Effect of Debt Solvency on Farmland Values: A Panel Cointegration Approach 
 
Farmland values in the United States represent a major component of the farm 
sector balance sheet.  Farmland values accounted for an average of 68 percent of total 
U.S. agricultural assets between 1960 and 2002.  This is important for several reasons.  
First, the opportunity cost of farmland represents a major production expense.  Second, 
the farm sector’s solvency is intimately linked to the value of farmland.  Third, the 
valuation of farmland has a significant effect on the estimation of sector productivity and 
competitiveness.  Fourth, the linkage between sector solvency and farmland values may 
also increase the coupling of farm program payments to current production decisions, 
driving a “wedge” between the market price of farmland and its true shadow price 
(opportunity cost) and leading to resource allocation inefficiencies. The significance of 
farmland values to the sector's economic performance has made factors determining 
farmland values a frequent subject of research in agricultural economics.   
 
Research into farmland values has typically emphasized expected returns, interest 
rates, and government payments to farmers among other factors.  However, the linkage 
between farmland values and agricultural debt has typically been ignored.  This exclusion 
can primarily be attributed to the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theorem, which states that 
asset values are independent of the financial means of ownership (debt or equity).  
However, the M-M results are based on arbitrage assumptions that may not be valid for 
agricultural asset markets.  In this study we test the M-M proposition for farmland by 
examining whether the solvency of the agricultural sector affects farmland values. Hence, 
the evidence suggests that credit constraints decrease the value of farmland. This linkage   3
between debt and farmland values in the agricultural sector also supports the existence of 
boom/bust cycles (Schmitz).   
Building on established literature, this study examines the role of credit and 
government payments in farmland valuation.  Particular attention is given to the role of 
credit constraints in this analysis. Following the model proposed by Shalit and Schmitz, 
invoking the M-M theorem, and Merton’s options pricing model, we hypothesize that 
farmland values are affected by credit constraints.  This hypothesis is consistent with the 
transaction cost hypothesis of Lence and Miller.  Credit availability limits an investor’s 
ability to buy and sell farmland.  Thus, a short-run decline in farmland values may be 
magnified if credit is restricted.  Farmers wanting to take advantage of a price decline in 
farmland may be prevented from doing so by changes in credit availability.  
This study is different from others in several ways.  First, it relates the farm 
investor’s investment financing decision to the Modigliani-Miller theorem.  Second, 
following Merton this study considers how default risk affects interest rates and farmland 
values. Finally, this study incorporates both the nonstationarity dimension of farmland 
values (first raised by Falk) and the panel structure of the data (state level panel data from 
1960-2002)  relying on recent advances in econometric literature. 
Literature Review 
Changes in farmland values have remained a frequent topic of interest in 
agricultural economics literature over the past four decades.  This focus on farmland 
prices is related to the inherent instability in the farm sector and to several characteristics 
of farmland in particular.  Lence and Miller noted that farmland accounts for a significant   4
share of agricultural balance sheet assets.  Changes in farmland values lead directly to 
significant changes in farm sector wealth (Schmitz).   
  Despite the importance of farmland values for the sector, empirical efforts to 
explain the fluctuations in land values have met with limited success.  In general, studies 
that have attempted to explain land values using present value models have found that 
farmland values exhibit at least short-term price bubbles (Schmitz, Schmitz and Moss, 
Featherstone and Baker, Falk).  Several studies have recently explained this behavior 
based on transaction cost models (Lence and Miller, Chavas and Thomas).   Lence and 
Miller determine that changes in land values are typically bounded by transaction costs 
(brokerage fees) in the short run.  Chavas and Thomas developed a dynamic model of 
farmland prices that includes non-additive dynamic preferences, risk aversion, and 
transaction costs.  They find that both risk aversion and transaction costs have significant 
effects on land prices. Thus, empirical results classified by rational bubbles in the present 
value models may actually be the result of transaction costs.  Additionally, the literature 
abounds with factors that have been linked to farmland prices including inflation (Moss; 
Feldstein), government payments (Tweeten and martin; Herdt and Cochrane; Clark et 
al.), capital gains (Melichar), net returns (Phipps; Burt; Alston; Featherstone and Baker; 
Falk), farm size, credit availability, input prices, risk, and taxes.  
  Credit is only one of the numerous variables possibly influencing farmland prices. 
In general finance, the Modigliani-Miller (M-M) theory expresses the relationship 
between asset values and the credit market. The proof of this proposition (M-M, 
proposition I) is based on the ability of either businesses or consumers to arbitrage equity 
for debt.  Miller describes the basic insight as the fact that consumers ultimately own all   5
the assets in the economy whether they are denominated in stocks (equity) or bonds 
(debt).  Thus, the aggregate balance sheet remains unchanged as consumers decide the 
proportion of each to hold.  Given this proposition, farmland values would be 
independent of the debt position in the farm sector.  In general, objections have been 
raised to M-M invariance based on three concepts: dividend policy, bankruptcy, and taxes 
(Miller p. 102).  The second of these objections may have significant consequences for 
agriculture.  In addition, the invariance of financing from asset values in agriculture can 
be questioned on the basis of the arbitrage formulation.  In general, new agricultural 
assets are purchased with either debt or retained earnings.  The sector has not been 
successful in attracting external equity to the sector
1. 
  Farm credit influences asset values in several ways.  First, debt influences 
profitability through interest costs.  Second, debt influences liquidity through debt-
servicing requirements (Barry, Baker, and Sanint).  Barry, Baker, and Sanint note that 
credit reserves are themselves subject to risk, and therefore credit risk must be accounted 
for in the farmer’s total portfolio risk, and in analysis of risk and liquidity management.  
Each of these components affects liquidity risk. Liquidity can be loosely defined as the 
ability of the borrower to meet cash obligations, as they are due.  These cash obligations 
can be met in a variety of ways such as holding cash, inventories, or credit reserves.  
However, the use of credit reserves may also raise the question of the farm’s liquidity 
risk.   Liquidity risk is the risk that a solvent but illiquid borrower is unable to obtain 
                                                 
1 The relationship between the rate of return on agricultural assets and other investments in risk 
pricing models (CAPM or the arbitrage pricing model) documents this fact.  As mentioned in 
footnote 1, Barry finds a positive, statistically significant constant in his CAPM formulation.  
Similarly, Shiha and Chavas find that agricultural returns are segmented from returns on other 
assets.  They conclude “…we are able to trace possible sources of segmentation to the existence 
of barriers to the flow of non-farm equity capital into farm real estate markets.” (p. 405)   6
refinancing.  In other words, it is the risk that your collateral will be worthless when you 
need it.  Penson also notes the importance of farm debt and solvency measures in 
evaluating financial stress.   
  Hughes et al. employed a CAP model to examine subsidized credit offered by 
USDA and its impact on agriculture.  They conclude that government subsidized credit 
likely increased farm real estate values, farmer’s holding of financial assets, and farm 
debt.  In their view it was highly unlikely that the rapid rise in farm real estate value 
during the 1970s should be attributed principally to the government intervention in farm 
credit markets, but likely was caused by other factors such as the rapid increase in farm 
exports. Credit availability could affect farmland markets.  Therefore, it is important that 
farm credit markets are efficient.  However, several studies suggest that credit constraints 
in the sector may be more binding than the sector’s financial condition would demand.  
Farmers face funding constraints on short-term operating loans.  If constraints exist, they 
will affect individual farm production decisions. 
In the credit rationing literature, Stiglitz and Weiss present a model in which the 
interest rate fails to appropriately clear the credit market, leading to credit rationing.  
They develop two agents: a lender and a borrower.  The “driving factor” within their 
proof is that the lender does not possess information about the borrower other than he/she 
was willing to borrow money at a stated interest rate.  The authors show that as the 
interest rate rises, the good credit risk leaves the market and the financial intermediary is 
left with the bad credit risk.  Thus, it may be in the bank’s interest not to raise the interest 
rate, but to ration credit instead.  Lee and Chambers, in an aggregate analysis, show that 
U.S. farmers experience credit constraints in financing variable production costs.  Their   7
work is an important component of a complete theory of lender behavior that recognizes 
that lenders may discriminate among borrowers. Innes (1990, 1991) examined imperfect 
information and information asymmetry as rationales for government intervention to 
address the impacts of information structures on credit markets. 
  Merton examined the risk structure of interest rates and how default risk affects 
interest rates and asset values.  This formulation is consistent with Stiglitz’s criticism of 
the M-M invariance proposition.  Specifically, Merton derived the debt contract as a form 
of an option price.  In this formulation, selling a corporate bond is identical to selling a 
European call option.  Under Merton’s framework, a corporation raises money by selling 
bonds that are secured by the corporation’s assets.  These bonds carry a fixed interest 
rate, but the return on the bonds is uncertain because of the possibility of bankruptcy.  
When the bonds mature, the corporation is left with the decision whether to pay off the 
bonds and keep the asset, or to default on the bonds and forfeit the corporation’s assets to 
the bondholders. Based on this general framework, the interest rate charged by banks is 
an increasing function of the debt-to-asset ratio and an increasing function of the variance 
of the rate of return on corporate assets. 
An Empirical Model of Farmland Values 
Given these three strands of literature, this section develops a market model of 
farmland values based on the rental market.  In order to incorporate the model of 
corporate debt as proposed by Merton into a farmland pricing model, we assume that the 
capital market between agriculture and the general economy does not allow for the 
infinite arbitrage of equity for debt.  Any capital flowing into agriculture is then in the 
form of debt.  Next, we assume that lenders price debt to agriculture based on their   8
opportunity cost of capital and the bankruptcy risk within the option pricing formulation 
proposed by Merton.  Given an increase in the relative risk of bankruptcy for agricultural 
assets, banks would charge a higher interest rate and the value of farmland would decline.  
Thus, a relative increase in agricultural debt without a corresponding increase in income 
implies an increase in bankruptcy risk, an increase in interest rate charged by banks, and 
a decline in agricultural asset prices.  The measure of interest obligations relative to 
income used in this study is the debt-service ratio (Ryan and Morehart).  The debt-service 
ratio is a liquidity ratio that measures the share of farm business gross income needed to 
service the debt. Under the option pricing model for debt, an increase in debt decreases 
liquidity because it increases the firm’s debt-servicing requirements. Specifically, the 
debt-service ratio rises as interest expenses increase. 
In our model, the rental price of farmland is based on the shadow value of 
farmland. The basic profit maximization problem facing the farm firm is to maximize 
profit subject to intermediate investments and land.  Given that the shadow value of 
farmland is above the annualized market price of farmland, the producer chooses to 
purchase additional acres.  Also, given our assumption regarding the capital market, we 
assume that purchase of farmland will be financed by issuing new debt (taking out a 
loan).  The overall model of farm profit then becomes: 
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where p is the vector of output prices, y is the vector of outputs, py is net of government 
payments, w is the vector of input prices, x is the vector of inputs, r(D,v) is the interest   9
rate paid on agricultural debt, D is the level of agricultural debt, GP represents a vector of 
government payments, v is the value of farmland, f(y,x,A,I) is a technological envelope of 
production possibilities, I is the level of intermediate capital, I0 is the fixed level of 
intermediate capital, D0 is the level of initial debt, and A0 is the initial land holding. This 
model is based on the notion that in long run equilibrium, farmland values will equal the 
discounted present value of future cash rents.  In order to develop r(D,v), we note that by 
the last constraint A0, I0 and D0 along with the value of farmland determine initial wealth 
0 0 0 0 D I v A E    . (2) 
By the same concept, the value of equity for the current level of land and debt are 
determined by A, I0, D and the value of land 
D I Av E    0 . (3) 
Taken together equations 2 and 3 imply the capital constraint in equation 1 given that 
E=E0 which must be true if we eliminate pure arbitrage (if we assume that the farmer 
cannot instantaneously make himself better off simply by purchasing farmland).  
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The debt to asset ratio is a decreasing function of farmland, farmland values, and 
intermediate investment, but an increasing function of debt.  Within this expression, we 
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Thus, assuming that banks use option pricing to set the interest rate, this debt to asset 
position implies that the optimal interest rate charged by the bank is an increasing   10
function of debt and a decreasing function of asset values (Merton). Given the 
maximization problem in equation 1, we form the Lagrangian: 
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 (6) 
where 1 is the shadow value of the technological envelope, 2 is the shadow value of 
intermediate assets, 3 is the shadow value of new debt, and 4 is the shadow value of 
government payments.  Focusing on the first order conditions with respect to land and 
debt yields: 
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In order to simplify the formulation, first note that by definition of the shadow values 
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Next, we substitute the first condition in 7 into the second along with equation 8 to yield 




















Equation 8 yields an implicit form of the demand equation for rented farmland.  
Specifically, taking the marginal interest rate as fixed by the capital market, equation 8 
determines the price of farmland that will clear the rental market.  Alternatively, with 
some minor rearrangements of this expression yield the capitalization formula 













. (9)   11
Assuming that agricultural interest rates are constant, equation 8 then yields the typical 
capitalization of future rents.  This formulation is similar to the deterministic approach 
found in the literature (Schmitz; Lence and Miller; and Falk).  
If we restrict the effect of additional debt on the interest rate to a multiplicative 
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where rf is some risk free rate.  Using Merton’s work we can argue that the interest rate 
on debt is only a function of the required rate of return, rf, and the probability of default 
or debt solvency. 
  Taking the natural logarithm difference of each side of equation 10 yields 
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Thus, to test for the importance of credit endogeneity, we can estimate 
     ) ln( ln ln ln ln 4 3 2 1 0 GP d T d r d R d v d t t At t                (13) 
where RA is the rate of return to farmland, r is the average interest rate on farm 
borrowing, T is a debt-servicing ratio
2 and GP represents government payments.    
                                                 
2 Approximating  ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 1    t t t d    as in Moss. This allows for the inclusion of 
stochastic future revenues accruing over the asset’s life.  
   12
Cointegration in Panel Data 
The theoretical model presented in equation 13 can be estimated using a variety of 
procedures.  However, since farmland values tend to be non-stationary (Falk 1991), 
regressions between non-stationary series may yield spurious results (Granger and 
Newbold 1974). Cointegration models based on Engle and Granger’s (1987) seminal 
work have been developed to analyze possible long-run equilibrium between non-
stationary variables. This study uses a recent innovation in the cointegration literature, 
namely estimation of panel data models.  In particular, we will estimate the cointegrating 
relationship using panel data as described in Baltagi and Kao (2000).  Panel data sets 
possess several advantages over conventional cross-sectional or time-series data sets 
(Hsiao, 2002). Our data set includes both cross-sectional (e.g., state-level) information as 
well as time-series information on farmland values, returns to farmland, interest rates, 
debt to asset ratios, and government payments. Based on the panel structure of the data, 
this study estimates the cointegrating relationship presented in equation 13 using 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) using NPT 1.3 (Kao and Chaing 2002). 
In order to develop the cointegration framework used in this study, we start from 
the basic definition of a non-stationary variable. A variable is said to be non-stationary if 
its autoregressive coefficient is equal to one. Mathematically, 
1 ttt yy               ( 1 4 )  
where  1   . One straightforward extension of this basic formulation in panel data 
would be to extend this formulation to istates 
,1 it i i t it yy              
 (15)   13
where  i  is the autogressive parameter for each state. Most panel approaches then assume 
that since  1 i   for each state a panel test for non-stationarity in panel data would 
simply imply that  1 i    or that the pooled autoregressive coefficient would 
approach a common coefficient equal to one if the data were non-stationary. To make this 
conjecture more palatable, we follow the formulation of Harris and Tzavalis (1999) and 
allow for heterogeneous drift 
,1 it i i t it yy              
 (16) 
where  i  is the heterogeneous drift parameter. 
Kao (1999) builds on this framework to develop a residual formulation for 
cointegration in panel data. Specifically, a long-run equilibrium (e.g., cointegrating) 
relationship exists in a time series if a stationary relationship exists between non-
stationary series. Based on this definition, an empirical formulation of the long-run 
relationship can be derived as 
,1 ˆˆ
ˆ






        
 (17) 
where  it it yx   depicts the estimated linear relationship between a panel of non-
stationary variables (e.g., the cointegrating relationship is   1   ),  ˆit e is the estimated 
residual and is the estimated autoregression coefficient for the linear relationship. 
Given this formulation if  1  then the residuals are stationary and a cointegrating 
relationship exists. Again note that and are pooled estimates.   14
To test for cointegrating relationships we first estimate , , and  ˆit e using 
ordinary least squares and then compute the DF (Dickey-Fuller) tests for .  t DF
 is a t-
test for the autoregressive coefficient (Table 1). DFis a Dickey-Fuller test based on the 
assumption of strong exogeniety. Both 
* DF  and 
*
t DF
 allow for the possibility of 
endogenous regressors. Implicitly these procedures work best if  N
T becomes large. 
Data 
We used U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service state-level 
data for 46 states
3 (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Pennsylvania and West Virginia), across 
10 production regions from 1960 to 2002.  These annual data on land values, interest 
rates, returns to farm assets, government payments, and debt servicing ratios are derived 
from a variety of sources such as the Census of Agriculture, various USDA agencies, 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) call reports, and the Farm Credit System. 
All prices and income are deflated using the implicit GDP deflator, 1992=100.   Return to 
land is derived in a manner similar to Melichar. Net farm income was adjusted by 
subtracting imputed returns to operator labor and management. Average real interest rate 
is the average interest rate on farm business debt (i.e., ratio of interest expenses minus 
interest expenses associated with operators dwelling expenses to average farm debt). 
Finally, the debt-servicing ratio is computed as the ratio of principal repayments plus 
interest expenses, excluding interest expenses associated with the operator’s dwelling, to 
gross farm income.  
                                                 
3  Complete dataset for these states were not available.   15
Results 
  The standard asset pricing literature suggests that the estimated coefficients on the 
returns to farmland be one, the estimated coefficient on the real interest rate be negative 
one, and the estimated coefficients on the debt-to-asset ratio and government payments 
coefficient be zero. (The later results imply that Modiglianni-Miller theorem of asset 
pricing holds and that income resulting from government transfers affects farmland 
values exactly likes income from the market). In general, the results depicted in table 2 
indicate that the returns to farmland have a positive effect on farmland values and that 
farmland values decline with an increase in the real interest rate. Further, both the 
estimated coefficient on the debt-to-asset ratio and the share of government payments 
tend to be statistically significant for most regions indicating that the standard application 
of asset valuation models is insufficient to explain the long-run equilibrium between land 
values, returns to farmland, and real interest rates. 
  Focusing on the estimated effect of returns to farmland on real land values, the 
results indicate that this effect is positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 for the 
United States and nine of the individual regions. Curiously, the Cornbelt is the only 
region where the relationship between returns to farmland and farmland values is not 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level. This result is curious because this region is 
typically most closely identified with commercial agriculture in the United States. 
However, apart from the significant positive relationship between the rate of return to 
farmland and the real value of farmland, the estimated parameters are less than the 
anticipated values (e.g., we would anticipate the estimated parameter to be equal to one). 
One possible reason for a coefficient less than one may be the relative risk associated   16
with agriculture. Specifically, using the certainty equivalence formulation of relative risk 
(Moss, Shonkwiler, and Schmitz 2003) the difference between the estimated coefficient 
and one could imply a risk premium. Under this interpretation agriculture in the Pacific 
States (e.g., California, Oregon, and Washington) is less risky than agriculture in the 
Lake States (e.g., Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin). However, this interpretation is 
also dependent on the possible effect of the solvency of agriculture discussed below. 
  Turning to the results with respect to the real interest rate, the estimated effect of 
real interest rates on real asset prices are uniformly negative and statistically significant 
with the exception of the Pacific region. Again, the estimated results are consistent in 
sign and statistical significance, but the relative magnitudes of the estimated coefficients 
appear somewhat incongruous. Like the case of the coefficients on returns to farmland 
discussed above, this difference may be partially attributed to relative risk. For example, 
an alternative formulation to risk than the certainty equivalent approach is the risk 
adjusted discount rate approach (RADR). If the capital market for investment alternatives 
is in equilibrium, then the capital asset pricing model (Mossin, Sharpe, Lintner) implies 
that the rate of return on a more risky asset must be higher than the rate of return on a less 
risky asset. This equilibrium can be depicted as either an increase in the discount rate 
applied to the investment or a decrease in the certainty equivalence. Thus, estimated 
coefficients that are more negative than anticipated may simply imply a higher relative 
risk. 
  Alternatively, the difference between anticipated and theoretical results may be 
the result of measurement error in the real interest rate. In this application the real interest 
rate is computed as the natural logarithm of the nominal interest rate computed from the   17
balance sheet and income statements less the logarithmic difference in the personal 
expenditure component of the implicit gross domestic product deflator. Setting aside the 
potential measurement error from our measure of inflation, the most probable source of 
measurement error comes from the use of the balance sheet and income statement to 
derive the nominal interest rate. Specifically, the appropriate discount rate for use in an 
asset-pricing model is a forward-looking marginal opportunity cost of capital. The 
balance sheet and income statement, on the other hand, yield a historical weighted 
average cost of capital. To the extent that this measure may understate the true forward-
looking cost of capital, the potential measurement error introduced could cause the 
estimated coefficient to be more negative than anticipated. 
  Both of the results above, however, must be viewed within the context of the 
estimated coefficients on both the debt to asset level and the share of income received as 
government payments. As indicated above, in the strictest application of the asset-pricing 
model both of these factors should have no impact on farmland values. Under the 
Modglianni-Miller theorem, asset values are invariant to the way an asset is financed 
(i.e., whether an asset is purchased using debt capital or equity capital, the asset will have 
the same value). Similarly, source of the income should have no impact on its present 
value. The empirical results presented in table 2 indicate that both of these restrictions are 
rejected for the United States and a preponderance of regions. As depicted in table 2, 
increased debt to asset ratios result in lower farmland values in nine of the ten regions 
(with the Southeast as the only exception where the effect is positive, but not statistically 
significant). Further, the negative effect of the debt to asset ratio is statistically significant 
at the 0.10 confidence level in six of the nine regions (with the exceptions being the Delta   18
States, the Southern Plains, and the Pacific States). Further, the negative effect of the debt 
to asset ratio on farmland values is statistically significance at the 0.10 level of 
confidence in the Pacific region. Thus, we are left to conclude that farmland values do 
not conform to the Modiglianni-Miller theorem, or that solvency of the agriculture sector 
affects the value of farmland. Further, increases in the debt to asset ratio (or decreases in 
the sector’s solvency) cause farmland values to decline. 
  The results for the effect of the share of income derived from government 
payments are less striking. While the coefficient for the impact of the share of income 
from government payments on farmland values is negative and statistically significant at 
the 0.05 confidence level for the United States as a whole, the estimated coefficient is 
negative in only eight regions (with the exceptions being the Northeastern States and the 
Lake States) and statistically significant at the 0.05 confidence level in only six regions. 
Even more disturbing, the positive coefficient in the Northeast region is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 confidence level. Thus, the results suggest that for the United 
States as a whole (and for most of the regions within the United States) farmland values 
are a decreasing function of the share of income derived from government payments.  
This effect is consistent with the findings of Moss, Shonkwiler and Reynolds (1989) who 
found that increases in the share of income derived from government payments caused 
the change in farmland values to be lower over time. 
  
Summary and Conclusions 
  This study examined whether farmland values in the United States were affected 
by changes in the sector’s solvency. Our results indicate that decreases in the sector’s 
solvency (measured as increases in the sector’s debt to asset ratio) resulted in   19
significantly lower farmland values. This result can be viewed in a variety of contexts. 
From an economic theory perspective, this result is contrary to Modiglianni-Miller 
theorem that contends that the value of an asset does not depend on how that asset is 
financed. One possible explanation of the theoretical discrepancy is the lack of efficient 
debt/equity arbitrage in the farm sector in the United States.  
  The theoretical derivation of the Modiglianni-Miller is based on arbitrage between 
stocks and bonds. Buying stocks and selling bonds or selling stock and buying bonds 
could rectify any undervaluation in the asset caused by financing. Historically, the farm 
sector in the United States has not been able to efficiently attract equity capital. Thus, the 
capital needs of the farm sector have largely been financed using debt. Hence, the value 
of farmland is determined by the cost of debt capital that may be priced using an option-
pricing framework as depicted by Merton. Decreased sector solvency (measured as 
increased debt to asset ratios) could increase the marginal cost of capital leading to lower 
farmland values. We would argue that our model allows for this affect by recognizing 
that our real interest rate variable measures the average historical interest rate. Thus, our 
solvency variable provides information about the relative change in the marginal real 
interest rate over time. That is, decreases in the sector solvency lead to increases in the 
marginal real interest rate paid by agriculture. 
  From a policy perspective, our results indicate that changes in the sector’s 
solvency may help explain the tendency of farmland values to exhibit boom/bust cycles 
as described by Schmitz and Featherstone and Moss.   20
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Table 1. Panel Test for Unit Roots 
 Test  StatisticCritical  Level 
Land Values     
Without Intercept or Trend  0.6057  0.2724 
With Intercept, Without Trend 0.1494  0.4406 
With Intercept and Trend  -49.0217  0.0000 
Returns to Farmland     
Without Intercept or Trend  -0.0043  0.4983 
With Intercept, Without Trend -15.7721  0.0000 
With Intercept and Trend  -49.1745  0.0000 
Real Interest Rate     
Without Intercept or Trend  -26.2386  0.0000 
With Intercept, Without Trend -6.9062  0.0000 
With Intercept and Trend  -9.0243  0.0000 
Debt Service Ratio     
Without Intercept or Trend  -0.1956  0.4225 
With Intercept, Without Trend -1.9238  0.0272 
With Intercept and Trend  -44.8227  0.0000 
Government Payments     
Without Intercept or Trend  -9.7385  0.0000 
With Intercept, Without Trend -14.9521  0.0000 
With Intercept and Trend  -39.3887  0.0000 
Source: Author’s Computations Using NPT 1.3   24
Table 2. Estimated Cointegrating Vectors and Tests Statistics for Cointegration 















Returns to Farmland  0.0476  0.8097  0.2942  0.8004  0.4737  0.7803  0.4765 0.4082 0.7265  0.9289 0.6996 
  t-Ratio  0.4559  11.5395  2.0415  11.2063  4.2937  9.4142  6.9266 3.3969 10.2860  9.7905 19.8029 
  Prob(T)  0.3247  0.0000  0.0219  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0006 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
  Prob(N)  0.3242  0.0000  0.0206  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0003 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Real Interest Rates  -9.0428  -3.2344  -5.3704  -4.7531 -6.6520 -4.0355 -3.3521 -6.3841 -2.9738  -0.2782 -4.3291 
  t-Ratio  -5.9257  -3.3769  -2.6286  -5.0872  -5.1961  -4.9926  -3.5573 -5.3777 -3.2713  -0.3003 -10.2671 
  Prob(T)  0.0000  0.0004  0.0050  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0003 0.0000 0.0006  0.3823 0.0000 
  Prob(N)  0.0000  0.0004  0.0043  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002 0.0000 0.0005  0.3820 0.0000 
Debt to Asset Ratio  -0.0366  -0.0766  -0.0470  0.0153  -0.0310  0.0016  -0.0004 -0.0029 -0.0335  -0.0100 -0.0397 
  t-Ratio  -4.0928  -8.3217  -3.6087  2.1012  -2.2368  0.2921  -0.0569 -0.1742 -4.5128  -1.3715 -11.7303 
  Prob(T)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0187  0.0133  0.3853  0.4774 0.4312 0.0000  0.0867 0.0000 
  Prob(N)  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002  0.0178  0.0126  0.3850  0.4773 0.4309 0.0000  0.0851 0.0000 
Government Payments  -0.1131  4.0122  0.8444  -0.3585  -1.8784  -2.0001  -1.2701 -1.5415 -1.3641  -3.2113 -0.8205 
  t-Ratio  -0.2193  1.7213  0.7655  -1.0611  -1.5947  -3.6712  -2.9971 -2.4252 -2.0485  -5.0012 -3.3545 
  Prob(T)  0.4134  0.0430  0.2229  0.1453  0.0563  0.0002  0.0017 0.0092 0.0207  0.0000 0.0004 
  Prob(N)  0.4132  0.0426  0.2220  0.1443  0.0554  0.0001  0.0014 0.0077 0.0203  0.0000 0.0004 
R-Squared 0.6535  0.6405  0.5026  0.8482  0.4399  0.7198  0.5796 0.7238 0.6831  1.0600 0.7273 
R-Bar-Squared 0.5540  0.1030  0.2633  0.2651  0.3024  0.6098  0.2481 0.6579 0.3397  0.3414 0.0217 
Source: Author’s computations using NPT 1.3   25
 
Table 2. Estimated Cointegrating Vectors and Tests Statistics for Cointegration (Continued) 
 Cornbelt  Northeast Lake  States
Northen 











DF_Rho  -0.7565  -2.1558  0.7116  -3.7442  -1.5745  -5.7206  -3.0375 -2.4369  -3.0735 -1.9262 -7.6297 
  Prob  0.2247  0.0156  0.2383  0.0001  0.0577  0.0000  0.0012  0.0074  0.0011  0.0270  0.0000 
DF_t_Rho 1.0038  9.2175  2.4300  0.5526  2.9728  -0.0888  0.0151  -0.9722  4.9402  0.3226  44.5628 
  Prob  0.1577  0.0000  0.0075  0.2903  0.0015  0.4646  0.4940  0.1655  0.0000  0.3735  0.0000 
DF_Rho_Star  -2.4758  -4.2386  -0.4274  -6.5157  -4.1417 -10.7386  -5.3844 -5.3781  -6.2639 -4.0296  -11.6744 
  Prob  0.0066  0.0000  0.3345  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
DF_t_Rho_Star -1.2105  -2.2804  -0.1417  -2.4905  -1.4884  -2.8687  -2.0155 -1.9189  -2.6697 -1.7590 -4.6146 
  Prob  0.1130  0.0113  0.4437  0.0064  0.0683  0.0021  0.0219  0.0275  0.0038  0.0393  0.0000 
Source: Author’s computations using NPT 1.3 
 
 
 